Announcement/Notes by Editors,
November, 1931
ANNOUNCEMENT
The UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW takes pleasure in announc-
ing the inauguration, with this issue, of the department of legislation. Subjects
of current interest and importance will be discussed fully from a legislative stand-
point.-Ed.
NOTES
THE LAW ScHooL-This year's enrollment is about II% below that of
I93O-3I1 Several causes may be operating to bring about this present trend,
which is not peculiar to Pennsylvania. The most obvious is the business depres-
sion which has made it impossible for some parents to carry sons through three
more years of University training, and for some students to find part-time employ-
ment neded to meet their marginal requirements. First year enrollment shows,
however, a satisfactory increase in the proportion of students attracted from a
distance within and without the State of Pennsylvania.2
i93o-3i enrollment was 494; this year's enrollment is 441.2 Institutional and geographic distribution of the First Year:
DEGaFE DismiBuTioN, FIRST YEAR CLASS
University of Pennsylvania: Gettysburg 2
College 32 Guilford I
Wharton 27 Haverford I
Miscellaneous I Harvard I
- 6o Lafayette 6
Other Institutions: Lehigh 8
Albright 2 McGill I
Allegheny I Muhlenberg I
American I New York I
Amherst I Notre Dame 2
Brown I Pennsylvania Mili-
Bucknell 3 tary I
Colgate I Pennsylvania State II
Columbia I Princeton 14
Cornell I Smith I
Davidson I St. Joseph's 5
Delaware I St. Thomas I
Dickinson 2 St. Vincent I
Duke I Susquehanna I
Franklin and Mar- Swarthmore 3
shall 4 Temple 18
Geneva I University of Illinois I
Georgetown 2 University of Mary-
land i
University of P
burgh
University of
ginia
Ursinus
Villanova
Washington and
Jefferson
Williams
Wesleyan
Yale
itts-
I
Vir-
2
5
2
I
2
I
- 121
Without college de-
gree, matriculated
1914
Total 182
33+% from U. of P.
66+% from other institu-
tions.
Philadelphia
Pennsylvania
Other States
First Year
Second Year
Third Year
GEoGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION
76
(outside Phila, elphia) 77
and foreign Cv itries 29
DISTRIBUrION IN CLASSES
182 Unclassified
127 Graduate
124
41+%
42 %
3
5
441
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With deepest regret we announce the death of four of our official staff.
Margaret Center Klingelsmith, for thirty-one years Librarian of the Biddle
Law Library, died January 19. A writer of charm and a learned scholar of early
common law history, Mrs. Klingelsmith with a unique knowledge of books
brought the library to a position of eminence among the great law school libraries
of the country. Layton B. Register has been appointed to succeed her. He
announces the recent acquisition of a valuable library of some 4000 volumes of
foreign and comparative criminal law now being catalogued and made ready for
scholars in this special field.
But a short time later Miss Sarah Center, cataloguer of the library, died.
This position has been filled by Edith Harris West, A. B., LL. B.
Stevens Heckscher, Esq., long a helpful friend of the Law School and since
1929 Associate in Law, teaching Legal Ethics, died on May 8. Professor
Reynolds D. Brown has resumed charge of this course, which he had taught for
many years.
On September 18 we learned of the tragic death by automobile accident of
Professor Austin Tappan Wright, while on his way eastward from California to
resume his teaching after a year's leave of absence. Professor Lloyd has else-
where in this issue 3 so well expressed the universal affection and respect felt for
Professor Wright that I need here only to outline the faculty adjustments made
to replace his loss this year.
Corporations will be taught by Robert Dechert, Esq.; Partnerships will be
taken by Earl G. Harrison, Esq. (LL. B. 1923) of the firm of Saul, Ewing,
Remick and Saul of Philadelphia. Professor Wright's course in Admiralty has
been dropped this year. Professor John Dickinson will teach Taxation in place of
Mr. Dechert. Carroll R. Wetzel, Esq., returns as Associate in Law to teach Sales.
Other interesting changes should be recorded. We welcome as Visiting
Professor of Law, Frederick Keating Beutel, A. B., LL. B., S. J. D., of Tulane
University Law School, New Orleans. He will teach Agency, Bills and Notes,
and First Year Property.
At the July Pennsylvania Bar Examinations the Law School sent up 114
new candidates of whom 70% passed. This was the largest number for any one
institution and the highest percentage of passes with one exception. 4
Herbert F. Goodrich.
THE NECESSITY OF A NOTICE AND HEARING IN ADMINISTRATIVE DETER-
M INATIONS-The question of what rules shall be applied to establish the conclu-
siveness or validity of a determination made by an administrative officer or board,
and affecting the person or property of an individual is essentially one of policy.L
' See page I.
Yale: 4 candidates, 3 passes, 75%.
' The present article is concerned with administrative determinations, not with adminis-
trative regulations. The former involve the judicial process of applying existing law to con-
crete situations of fact, the latter involve the exercise of delegated legislative authority in
establishing a general rule of conduct for the future, State ex rel. Medical College v. Chit-
tenden, 127 Wis. 468, 107 N. W. 500 (19o6). The precise line of demarcation, however, is
hard to delimitate. A judicial determination involves the application of a rule of conduct,
not mere discretion, Vincent v. Seattle, 115 Wash. 475, 197 Pac. 618 (1921) ; yet a valid
delegation of legislative power to an administrative agency also requires that a course of
procedure and rules of decision be imposed upon the agency, Wichita R. & Light Co. v.
Public Utilities Comm. of Kansas, 26o U. S. 48, 43 Sup. Ct. 51 (1922). Notice and hearing
are not required before the making of an administrative regulation, Commonwealth v. Sisson,
189 Mass. 247, 75 N. E. 618 (1905).
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On the one hand it is desirable that administrative officers should be free to exer-
cise their judgment and discretion in acting to promote what they conceive to be
the public good. This is the purpose for which they have been appointed. Fre-
quently they are specialists in a field requiring technical skill in making deter-
minations. Utilities commissioners and health authorities are-at least in theory-
selected because of scientific qualifications. On the other hand is the necessity
of safeguarding the interests of individuals from gross errors of judgment, over-
zealous extensions of authority, arbitrariness and oppression by particular officers,
as well as from whims of public opinion recklessly disregardful of long-established
and socially-beneficial private rights.2 One of the most efficient methods of pro-
tecting the individual from misuse of administrative authority is to allow him a
fair opportunity to be heard by the determining officers prior to their final decision
on a matter affecting his interests. He may be able to disclose facts unknown to
them or to reveal the question in a new light. If the authorities are dishonest a
public hearing will restrict their opportunities for oppression or graft.3 If they
are incompetent a record of what occurs at the hearing may enable a reviewing
body, whether judicial tribunal or superior board, to correct their errors.
4  If
they are neither unfair nor unskilled, a simple presentation of the individual's
case will tend to bring about a just decision rendered with full knowledge of all
the facts and interests involved.' And notice to the person affected, in sufficient
time to prepare his case, of the time and place of the hearing, is a necessary ele-
ment of the opportunity to be heard." Notice and hearing, however, detract to
some extent from administrative efficiency. They involve delay and expense.
Publicity may deter government investigators from frankly reporting a harsh
truth, or disturb the relationship of confidence and discipline between inferior and
superior officer.7  Since the American and English law of administrative bodies
is still in a formative state and has hardly yet had time to develop fixed rules
covering the more usual situations of administrative procedure, a court is often
obliged to determine the necessity or sufficiency of notice and hearing in a par-
ticular case by balancing the desirability of governmental efficiency against the
safeguard afforded by notice and hearing in situations of the general type pre-
sented by the case at bar.'
Elements such as the existence of safeguards other than notice and hearing
may affect the balance. The findings of fact of an administrative officer or board
may be subject to a complete review on the merits in a tribunal where notice and
hearing are to be had; or they may be subject to reversal only when they have so
little support in the evidence that a jury verdict based on the same testimony
would be set aside; or a determination may be entirely conclusive as to matters
of fact and be only reviewable for errors of law. An inconclusive determination
can often be rendered ex parte where a conclusive determination upon the same
"DICKINSON, AMIrNISTRATIVZ JUSTICE AND THE SUPREMACY OF LAW (1927) c. I, V;
Goodnow, Private Rights and Administrative Discretion (1916) 41 A. B. A. REn'. 4o8.
' State ex rel. Meader v. Sullivan, 58 Ohio St. 504, 51 N. E. 48 (1898) ; Goodnow, op.
cit. supra note 2, at 422.
'Kwock Jan Fat v. White, 253 U. S. 454, 40 Sup. Ct. 566 (1920) ; State v. Lamos, 26
Me. 258 (3846).
'Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago, R. I. & Pac. Ry. Co., :66 Ill. 567, 1o7 N. E. 841
(1915) ; State v. Jersey City, 24 N. J. Law 662 (855).
' Blunt v. Shepardson, 286 Ill. 84, 121 N. E. 263 (1918) ; Kuntz v. Sumption, 117 Ind. I,
ig N. E. 474 (1888).
Local Government Board v. Arlidge [1915] A. C. 12o.
S For an illustration of the diverse results that have been reached in balancing the equi-
ties presented by a particular factual situation, compare the decision in Rex v. Local Gov-
ernment Board, Ex parte Arlidge [19141 1 K..B. 16o, with that in Local Government Board
v. Arlidge, supra note 7, and with the criticisms in Dicey, The Development of Administrative
Law in England (1915) 31 L. Q. REv. 148; in Pound, The Revival of Personal Government
(1917) 4 PROC. N. H. BAR Ass'N (N. s.) 13; and in'Note (1914) 28 HARv. L. Rav. 198.
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subject would require notice and hearingY Another factor mentioned in some
of the decisions is the personnel of the determining board, whether composed of
experts or laymen, whether apt to contain men of recognized ability or merely
local politicians." It is also important that the determining officer is an obscure
appointive functionary or that he is the holder of a post making him directly
responsible to the electorate and exposing his conduct to continual publicity.1 ,
Despite the indefiniteness of the elements involved the situations in which notice
and hearing are requisite to the validity of administrative determinations have been
approximately defined by the decisions of the last half century.
There are, moreover, two balances in which American courts have tested the
validity of administrative procedure, a constitutional balance, and an administra-
tive balance. Utilizing the former, a court determines whether the particular
procedure adopted does or does not deny "due process of law" or some other
constitutional right.'2  Utilizing the latter a court decides whether or not the
procedure is a fair and proper manner of proceeding viewed in the light of the
generally accepted principles of judicial and governmental action.13 Under either
doctrine there is the same balancing of interests, the same consideration of
whether the procedure was "just", had respect to the "fitness of things", and was
carried on "under the forms, and with the machinery provided by the wisdom of
successive ages for the investigation judicially of the truth of a matter in contro-
versy." 11 Generally speaking, the procedure followed by the administrative
officers should involve a clearer disregard of these requirements to induce a court
to reject it for unconstitutionality than for it to be condemned as violative of the
common law of administrative bodies.'3 American courts have commonly tended
to consider the problem a constitutional one instead of a mere question of proper
administrative procedure. This has had the advantage-or disadvantage-of
enabling the courts to insist on their own view of procedural requirements in the
' Kuntz v. Sumption, supra note 6. The decision in the leading case of Chicago, Mil-
waukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, 134 U. S. 418, ia Sup. Ct. 462, 702 (i89o), that
denial of notice and hearing by a state railroad rate commission was a denial of "due process
of law", was expressly placed upon the ground that by the law of the state the decision of
the commission as to the reasonableness of a rate was not reviewable by the courts. For
the various methods of judicial review, as used in Pennsylvania, see Note (1929) 78 U. OF
PA. L. REV. 232.
"0Yates v. Milwaukee, IO Wall. 497 (1870) ; People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health
of City of Yonkers, 14o N. Y. I, 35 N. E. 320 (893) ; DIcxINsoN, op. cit. supra note 2, at
262.
.Shurtleff v. United States, 18p U. S. 311, 23 Sup. Ct. 535 (1903) (limitation on Pres-
ident's power to remove officeholders strictly construed) ; Wilcox v. People, go Ill. 186 (1878)
(same as to Governor's power to remove). In Local Government Board v. Arlidge, supra
note 7, the "parliamentary responsibility" of the Board was emphasized.
" 'Due process of law' is not confined to judicial proceedings, but extends to every case
which may deprive a citizen of life, liberty, or property, whether the proceeding be judicial,
administrative, or executive in its nature." Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183, 19o (1878).
"In judging what is 'due process of law' respect must be had to the cause and object of
the taking, whether under the taxing power, the power of eminent domain, or the power of
assessment for local improvements, or none of these: and, if found to be equitable or admis-
sible in the special case it will be adjudged to be 'due process of law'; " Bradley, J.,
in Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 97, lO7 (877).
"'It is a rule founded on the first principles of natural justice older than written con-
stitutions, that a citizen shall not be deprived of his life, liberty or property without an oppor-
tunity to be heard in defense of his rights. . . ." Stuart v. Palmer, supra note 12, at 19o.
And see Chin Yow v. United States, 208 U. S. 8, 28 Sup. Ct. 201 (igo8) ; State ex re. Med-
ical College v. Chittenden, supra note I; Cooper v. Board of Works, 14 C. B. (N. s.) i8o
(1863) ; DeVerteuil v. Knaggs [1918] A. C. 557; Frankfurter, The Task of Administrative
Law (927) 75 U. OF PA. L. REv. 614.
" Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota, supra note 9, at 457, 10 Sup. Ct.
at 266.
' See Federal Trade Comm. v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U. S. 298, 44 Sup. Ct. 336
(1924).
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face of contrary statutory provisions. It has also permitted federal courts to
regulate state administrative bodies. On the other hand it has tended to prevent
the development of administrative law as a distinct branch of our legal system.
In many cases the power of an administrative officer or board to make a
determination is derived from a statute which prescribes no specific method to be
followed by the authorities in arriving at their decision. Where this is the situa-
tion it is commonly said that notice and hearing will be implied, that is, the court
will presume that the legislature meant the authorities to act with reference to the
safeguards proper to the case.' Particularly is this true if without notice and
hearing the action of the officials would involve a denial of "due process", for
under such circumstances the statute would be rendered unconstitutional, unless
interpreted as requiring notice and hearing.' But in New York, apparently by
reason of a legislative custom to include in a statute express provisions for notice
and hearing whenever such procedure was contemplated by the legislators, it is
held that a requirement of notice and hearing is not to be read into a statute even
to forestall a judicial declaration of its unconstitutionality.', If a statute is
interpreted as dispensing with notice and hearing where to do so involves a denial
of "due process', the grant of a full hearing by the administrative officers, as a
favor, will not validate their proceedings," since the statute from which they
purported to derive their authority to act in the first instance was unconstitutional.
By application of the various lines of reasoning outlined above, the courts
have worked oui rules covering the more customary administrative determinations.
Perhaps the best generalization that can be made of the whole field is that there
must be one notice and one hearing however summary, at some stage in the pro-
ceedings in order to prevent a determination affecting individual interest from
involving a denial of "due process of law".'0 What more may be required in
certain situations, and what exceptions, if any, exist to the general rule can only
be discovered by an examination of the cases relating to the particular type of
determination in issue.
Determinations involving the obligations of an official to the government
itself, and the correlative obligations of the government to its servants form a
class presenting special problems of its own. The relationship of employer and
employee as well as the relationship of citizen and magistrate is involved. The
necessity of maintaining discipline and efficiency within the governmental machine
" People, for use of State Board of Health v. McCoy, 125 Ill. 289, 17 N. E. 786 (1888) ;
State ex rel. Medical College v. Chittenden, sapra note I; Cooper v. Board of Works, supra
note 13.
1t Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U. S. 86, 23 Sup. Ct. 611 (19o3) ; Bratton v. Chandler,
260 U. S. 110, 43 Sup. Ct. 43 (1922).
' People ex rtl. Fonda v. Morton, 148 N. Y. 156, 42 N. E. 538 (1896); People ex rel.
Lodes v. Dep't of Health of New York City, 189 N. Y. 187, 82 N. E. 187 (1907). In People
ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, supra note IO, a similar decision was
placed on the ground that notice and hearing should not be implied in a statute authorizing
the abatement of nuisances because speedy action was desirable for the protection of the
public.
" Kuntz v. Sumption, supra note 6; Stuart v. Palmer, s:ipra note 12.
"Undoubtedly where life and liberty are involved, due process requires that there be a
regular course of judicial proceedings, which imply that the party to be affected shall have
notice and an opportunity to be heard; so, also, where title or possession of property is in-
volved." Field, J., in Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. IO8, III U. S. 701, 708, 4 Sup. Ct.
663, 667 (1884).
"In the comparatively few cases in which such question has arisen it has been distinctly
recognized that administrative orders, quasi-judicial in character, are void if a hearing was
denied; if that granted was inadequate or manifestly unfair; if the finding was contrary to
the 'indisputable character of the evidence'; or if the facts found do not, as a matter of
law, support the order made." Lamar, J., in Interstate Commerce Comm. v. Louisville &
Nashville Ry. Co., 227 U. S. 88, 91. 33 Sup. Ct. I85, 186 (0913). And see Pittsburg, C. C.
& St. L. Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U. S. 421, i4 Sup. Ct. 1114 (1894); Kaoru Yamataya v.
Fisher, supra note 17.
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counts heavily. Accordingly the rule has long been fixed that, in the absence of
statute, appointive officers possessing no definite term of office may be dismissed
by the officer having the power of removal without notice and hearing.2 But if
a constitution or statute provides that removal is to be for specified causes only,
then notice and hearing must be given,2 2 unless the language or circumstances of
the enactment lead to a contrary inference.22 This power of summary dismissal
is nothing but the ordinary "firing" power of the private employer and is not to
be limited except as the legislature sees fit. In at least one respect, however, the
government may enforce the obligations of its servants by a procedure over-
reaching anything permissible to a private employer; for the government may
determine the amount due it from a revenue officer, and then may collect the
amount claimed, by distress upon his property, without allowing him any oppor-
tunity to challenge the correctness of the accounting unless he prevents the dis-
tress by posting security for the amount claimed, to abide the result of a subse-
quent judicial review of the accounting.
2 4
Although it has been often said that the government's urgent need for finan-
cial supplies, necessary for the performance of its duties towards the community,
dispenses with the requirement of a formal procedure in matters of taxation and
revenue,15 nevertheless "due process" requires notice and hearing where others
than government officers are concerned. In assessment cases generally, whether
for taxes 28 or for improvement benefits, 27 notice and hearing must be given at
some period prior to collection.
2 8
In assessment proceedings notice and hearing customarily occur in the latter
rather than in the earlier stages of the proceedings. 9 If the owner objects to the
valuation placed on his property by the assessor he may appeal to a reviewing
board, usually called a "board of equalization", and present his case before it.30
It is to be noted in tax cases that the assessor's work is primarily dependent on
.Shurtleff v. United States, supra note i i; People ex rel. Gere v. Whitlock, 92 N. Y.
191 (1883).
'Ham v. Board of Police of City of Boston, 142 Mass. go (1886) ; Dullam v. Wilson,
53 Mich. 392, I9 N. W. 112 (1884) ; People ex r-el. Shuster v. Humphrey, I56 N. Y. 231, 50
N. E. 86o (1898). See Joyce v. City of Chicago, 216 Ill. 466, 471, 75 N. E. 184, i86 (195o).
Contra: Wilcox v. People, supra note 1I.
'Trainor v. Board of Auditors, 89 Mich. 62, 5o N. W. 809 (i891) (express provision
for "charges and evidence" in one statutory ground of removal, but not in others) ; People
cx tel. Fonda v. Morton, supra note 18 (statute extended to all ex-soldiers in state employ-
ment even if only common laborers).
- Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., iS How. 272 (1855). Despite
the fact that this decision was expressly put on the ground that the procedure here outlined
did not substantially differ from that customarily employed against reveniue officers in Eng-
land and the Colonies, this case has often been used to justify "high-handed" methods of en-
forcing the revenue laws against others than government officers.
See Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. io8, supra note 2o, at 708, 4 Sup. Ct. at 667.
-Central of Georgia Ry. Co. v. Wright, 207 U. S. 127, 28 Sup. Ct. 47 (907) ; Ameri-
can Express Co. v. Raymond, 189 Ill. 232, sg N. E. 528 (19oi).
'Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. io8, supra note 20; Corcoran v. Board of Aldermen
of Cambridge, I99 Mass. 5, 85 N. E. I55 (I9o8) ; State v. Jersey City, supra note 5.
'While a board of tax review or equalization can only alter the original valuation placed
by the assessor on an individual's property after notice and hearing, it may alter the general
rate of assessment for a whole county or city without granting a hearing to the taxpayers or
their representatives, Bi-Metallic Investment Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 239 U. S.
441, 36 Sup. Ct. 141 (1915). In such event the board is regarded as acting in a legislative
rather than an administrative capacity.
-9 See, for an illustration of such procedure, Kuntz v. Sumption, supra note 6.
"Palmer v. McMahon, 133 U. S. 66o, 1o Sup. Ct. 324 (89o) ; Corcoran v. Board of
Aldermen of Cambridge, supra note 27. ". . . due process of law requires that at some
stage of the proceedings before the tax becomes irrevocably fixed, the taxpayer shall have
an opportunity to be heard, of which he must have notice, either personal, or by publication,
or by law, fixing the time and place of the hearing." Londoner v. Denver, 210 U. S. 373, 385,
28 Sup. Ct. 708, 714 (I9O8).
personal knowledge and skill rather than on information obtainable only from
others ;31 that the review is by a direct appeal to a superior administrative author-
ity instead of by a collateral proceeding in a judicial tribunal; such as a bill to
restrain collection of the tax; and finally that the reviewing board makes an entire
new decision on the merits. The situation would be entirely different were the
decision of the assessor conclusive as to findings of fact, or conclusive even within
the limits of a jury verdict. In such event the taxpayer would come before the
board with much of his case prejudged against him by an ex parte determination,
and consequently would be deprived of "due process".3 2  But where there is an
appeal on the merits to a "board of equalization" the taxpayer has the same
opportunity to present his case before the board as he would have had before the
assessor, and the state is saved the burden of a hearing except where an owner
feels that injustice has been done him. For similar reasons assessments are also
valid where the taxpayer's first opportunity to be heard occurs in a formal judicial
proceeding brought to enforce the tax.3'
Notice and hearing, though of a rather summary character, are requisite to
the validity of appraisements and valuations made by customs officers.3 4
Where the determination of a public utility commission is involved, or the
decision of any other of the increasing number of boards regulating business,
notice and hearing are essential.3 ' The administrative authorities are here con-
sidered to be restricting the use of property in ways otherwise legal, and conse-
quently they must respect the doctrine that deprivation of property without "due
process of law" is unconstitutional. The strict conformity to this doctrine which
the Supreme Court-and Congress also 3 8 -has imposed upon the Interstate
Commerce Commission and similar bodies seems particularly important as setting
a high standard of procedure in an expanding field of administrative activity. An
example of the willingness of the federal courts to require notice and hearing in
utilities cases is found in their broadly inclusive attitude respecting the classes of
persons sufficiently affected by an administrative proceeding to be entitled to a
hearing. The Transportation Act of 192o provided that no railroad should pur-
chase another without the consent of the Interstate Commerce Commission.
Although the intention of the act was primarily to protect the public interest in
free competition and not to protect the interests of individual railroads, the
Supreme Court held in the Chicago Junction Case '7 that any railroad whose
traffic might suffer from the proposed purchase had the right to intervene in the
proceedings and be heard by the Commission. Under the present Federal Radio
Act giving any broadcasting station the right to object to the grant of a license to
another station whose operation might interfere with its own service, it has
recently been held that the objecting station is entitled to a hearing by the Federal
Radio Commission before a license is granted the applicant.38
State v. Jersey City, supra note 5.
"Kuntz v. Sumption, supra note 6.
'Hagar v. Reclamation Dist. No. io8, supra note 20; Security Trust & Safety Vault
Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323, 27 Sup. Ct. 87 (I9O6).
' Origet v. Hedden, I55 U. S. 228, 15 Sup. Ct. 92 (1894); Tariff Act, 1922, § 5oi; 42
STAT. 7166, i9 U. S. C. 381.
"Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. Co., supra note 9; San Diego Land & Town Co.
v. National City, 174 U. S. 739, I9 Sup. Ct. 804 (1899) ; Interstate Commerce Comm. v.
Louisville & Nashville Ry. Co., supra note 20; Farmers' Elevator Co. v. Chicago, R. I. &
Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 5.
"Mr. Justice Brandeis lists the following determinations of the Interstate Commerce
Commission as requiring notice and hearing under the Hepburn Act of i9o6 and the Trans-
portation Act of I92o: unreasonable rates, discriminatory rates, switching connections, di-
vision of joint rates, pooling, railroad control of water carriers, valuation, extension of time
for new construction, and abandonment; an order for the issuance of securities requires no
hearing, Chicago Junction Case, 264 U. S. -258, 265, 44 Sup. Ct. 317, 319 (1924).
"Supra note 36.
'Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 48 Fed. (2d) 461 (Ct. of App. D. C. I93i).
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In sharp contrast to this tendency of the federal courts is the rather lukewarm
attitude towards notice and hearing taken by the state courts in cases involving
the police power. At the common law an officer who made an arrest was not
required to give a hearing to the supposed culprit before taking him into custody,
but if there was no sufficient ground for the arrest the officer was liable to an
action for false imprisonment. 39 So also if an officer abated an alleged public
nuisance he need give no notice to the owner of the property about to be destroyed,
but he ran the peril of satisfying a jury that a nuisance had actually existed.
40
The ancient methods of relief against arbitrary official action by means of damage
suits early came to be applied to administrative determinations by officials, irre-
spective of fitness, because of their foundation in custom and "the law of the
land", the ancestors of "due process". 4'
In Belcher v. Farrar,42 decided in 1864, town selectmen adopted an ordinance
requiring a kerosene factory to be closed as a nuisance without allowing the
proprietor an opportunity to be heard. The ordinance was held valid on the
ground that the statute conferring the power to close a business as a nuisance
expressly provided that the determination of the selectmen might be reviewed in
an action at law. The court seized on this legislative recognition of the common
law rule, that the determination of an official cannot make a nuisance out of that
which is not a nuisance in law,43 in order to draw from it a corollary doctrine that
notice and hearing were unnecessary for the validity of a determination which
was subject to review in a jury trial. Four years later, in Salem v. Eastern Rail-
way Co.,44 an action was brought by a municipality to recover the expense of
draining a pond from the owner, who had refused to do the draining after the
municipal authorities had determined ex parte that the pond constituted a nuisance.
The court held that this determination was not conclusive of the issue "nuisance
or not" in the suit at bar, because it had been rendered in another proceeding to
which the defendant had not been a party inasmuch as he had not been heard.
But the court also said that while such a determination could not be binding in
personam it would be binding in rein, since the pond was within the jurisdiction
of the municipality, and consequently it would protect from damage suits those
who had abated the alleged nuisance. The opinion thus placed administrative
determinations on a parity with judicial determinations when rendered with juris-
diction of either the party or the res-notice and hearing being essential to the
former jurisdiction, but not to the latter-instead of placing them on a parity with
purely ministerial and non-discretionary acts as in Belcher v. Farrar.
In the leading case of Miller v. Horton 45 the Massachusetts court was in
effect forced to choose which of these two decisions it would follow. A statute
gave a state board power to kill diseased animals. The defendant killed the
plaintiff's horse in pursuance of an order of the board made without a hearing.
The plaintiff having brought an action of tort for killing the horse, the jury found
that the horse was not diseased. Had the court chosen to follow the analogy of
a judicial determination in rem it could have upheld the decision of the board
against collateral attack; instead it concluded that the board had power to kill
"See Groenvelt v. Burwell, I Ld. Raym. 454, 467 (I6g).
'Hutton v. City of Camden, .9 N. J. Law 122 (1876), in stating that the issue of
"nuisance or! not" can only be determined in judicial proceedings and without respect to a
prior administrative determination even after hearing, typifies the condition existing prior
to the growth of an administrative procedural law when determination by a court was con-
ceived to be the only alternative to determination by an officer in any way he saw fit.
"Goodnow, op. cit. supra note 2, at 414.
8 Allen 325 (Mass. 1864).
"Yates v. Milwaukee, supra note io; COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONs (8th ed.
1927) I325n.
" 98 Mass. 431 (1868).
"152 Mass. 540, 26 N. E. oo (i891).
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diseased cattle only, that is, that its function was ministerial rather than deter-
minative, and intimated that if the statute intended to give the board a determina-
tive power it would be unconstitutional unless compensation was provided for
mistakes of the board, or unless the owner was entitled to a hearing before the
board acted.48
Two years later in the New York case of People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of
Health of City of Yonkers 47 the doctrine of collateral attack was carried still
further. The Board after a hearing ordered certain mill-ponds destroyed as
nuisances. The owner brought certiorari to review this determination. The
Court of Appeals denied the writ on the ground that if the ponds were not nui-
sances the owner would have a right of action for damages against the Board if
they were destroyed, and that the existence of this right of action made it unneces-
sary for the Board to grant a hearing, and also rendered unnecessary a direct
review of the Board's determination by certiorari.
However historically sound the rule may be that an ex parte determination is
not unconstitutional if it is subject to a full review on the merits in an action at
law for damages or a bill in equity for an injunction," the extension of this rule
so as to exclude review by any other process, or so as to dispense with the neces-
sity for notice and hearing prior to the administrative determination, is subject to
criticism as a matter of sound administrative practice. It forces the officers to
act at their peril unless they obtain a prior judicial adjudication of the very
question which the legislature intended them to decide for themselves. It obliges
the individual to resort to cumbersome and expensive proceedings to mend that
which need not have been done; and unless he can act swiftly enough to obtain
the interposition of an injunction it allows his property to be destroyed subject to
a right of action against individuals of dubious solvency.49  Finally it does away
with the chief advantage of a hearing, namely, to inform the determining authori-
ties in order that they may arrive at a correct decision. It is not noticeable that
the doctrine of collateral attack is not applied in the utilities or tax cases. While
the language of the opinions is sufficiently sweeping to extend it to all cases
falling under the police power, nearly all the decisions involve an emergency, an
apparent imminent danger to the community, as a threatening epidemic, which
will brook no delay for notice and hearing.50 Restricted to cases where speed of
action is preferable to accuracy of decision, the provision of notice and hearing
for the first time in a collateral action may possibly be the most practical solution
of a problem apt to involve hardship on someone.51
A possibility that seems to have been overlooked in many cases is that of
keeping the alleged nuisance under quarantine until there has been time to have a
hearing. This is eminently practicable in cases where a particular use of property
' Similar decisions involving the destruction of epidemic-threatening property are:
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago. 211 U. S. 3o6, 29 Sup. Ct. ioi (i9o8) ; Pear-
son v. Zehr, 138 Ill. 48, 29 N. E. 854 (i8pi) ; Lowe v. Conroy, 120 Wis. 151, 91 N. W. 742
(1904).
' Supra note io. See also Board of Health of City of Yonkers, 14o N. Y. 12, 35 N. E.
443 (1893).
,s See People ex rel. Copcutt v. Board of Health of City of Yonkers, supra note io.
,Goodnow, op. cit. supra note 2, at 418.
'In Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133, 14 Sup. Ct. 499 (1894), and Health Dept. of City
of New York v. Trinity Church, 145 N. Y. 32, 39 N. E. 833 (1895), no emergency was in-
volved, yet in the former case property was allowed to be destroyed, and in the latter an
order carrying a penalty for violation was permitted to be made, both without a hearing, on
the ground that they were subject to attack in the courts.
r' DicxiNsoT, op. cit. supra note 2, at 26o; Goodnow, op. cit. sapra note 2, at 417. In
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, supra note 46, the court intimated that to
apply the doctrine of collateral attack to other than emergency situations would involve a
denial of "due process", but held that it was for the legislature to determine when an emer-
gency existed.
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rather than the nature of the property itself is in question. Temporary dosing
of a business pending final determination has been held to involve no tort liability
by analogy to imprisonment pending trial.
52
Although Salem v. Eastern Railway Co.53 has not been followed in the United
States, some English cases have tended to uphold the distinction there drawn.
Thus the ex parte determination of a justice as to the unfitness of meat for food
is conclusive on the question of whether the food is to be destroyed,5 4 but is not
conclusive in a proceeding to exact a statutory penalty for exposing the meat for
sale.55 While the Supreme Court of the United States has been willing to go
further than this in protecting an individual from arbitrary destruction of his
property, 8 it has not been willing to go so far in protecting him from amercement
by administrative fiat; for, notwithstanding that an "infamous crime" requires a
jury trial as a matter of constitutional right,5 7 a pecuniary penalty for violation
of customs or immigration regulations may be imposed by the officials without
notice and hearing, collected summarily by the Treasury, and cannot be recovered
by an action at law because in such action the officers' findings of fact will be held
conclusive."' The complete denial of notice and hearing under this ruling was
justified by the Supreme Court in Oceanic Steam Navigation Company v. Strana-
han "I because of the "plenary power" of Congress over imports and immigrants.
Expanded to full length the argument runs thus: Congress has power to exclude
immigrants entirely; therefore it has power to admit immigrants subject to what-
ever conditions it chooses to impose; therefore it may impose as conditions (i)
that whoever attempts to bring in a certain type of immigrant shall be subject to
a penalty, and (2) that whoever attempts to bring in immigrants shall submit to
the determination of the immigration authorities as to whether these immigrants
are within the forbidden type. Admitting the soundness of this argument consti-
tutionally, its application to situations where, as in the Oceanic case, the legisla-
ture has not expressly closed the door to notice and hearing goes very far towards
dispensing with any necessity for a hearing as a requirement of administrative
law, in those situations where it would not have been unconstitutional for the
legislators to deny altogether the privilege of a hearing.
The earliest of the exclusion cases, Ekiu v. United States6 tended to a
similar result, but the later decisions have established the rule that there must be
a notice and hearing in all cases involving the right to enter or remain in the
United States, at least where the person affected claims to be a citizen, 61 or has
once entered the United States so as to "become a part of its population" and
"subject to its jurisdiction". 62
In general where the determination under consideration is one involving
something which is not considered so much a matter of right as a beneficence or
Belcher v. Farrar, supra note 42.
Supra note 44.
' White v. Redfern, .5 Q. B. D. i5 (1879).
Waye v. Thompson, 15 Q. B. D. 342 (1885).
"If a party cannot get his hearing in advance of the seisure and destruction he has the
right to have it afterward, which right may be claimed upon the trial in an action brought
for the destruction of his property, and in that action those who destroyed it can only suc-
cessfully defend if the jury shall find the fact of unwholesomeness as claimed by them."
North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, supra note 46, at 316, 29 Sup. Ct. at IO4.
.Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U. S. 228, i6 Sup. Ct. 977 (I896).
' Oceanic Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U. S. 320, 29 Sup. Ct. 671 (1908).
' Supra note 58.
142 U. S. 65i, 12 Sup. Ct. 336 (1892).
" Chin Yow v. United States, supra note I3; Chew Hay Quong v. White, 249 Fed. 869
(C. C. A. 9th, 1918) (citizen's alleged wife) ; Kwock Jan Fat v. White, supra note 4.
' Kaoru Yamataya v. Fisher, supra note 17; United States ex rel. Tisi v. Tod, 264 U. S.
131, 44 Sup. Ct. 260 (1924).
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gift offered by the government to those fulfilling certain requirements, as are
pensions and land grants, there is a tendency to consider that the legislature
intended the officers charged with the administration of the gift to be unhampered
by procedural safeguards against arbitrary decisions.6 Postal cases are usually
considered to be within this classification, yet notice and hearing are granted by
statute where mailing privileges are at stake.6" The government monopoly of the
postal service, however, prevents use of the mails from being in reality a mere
favor. But the granting or withdrawing of licenses furnishes the greater part of
the determinations falling under the "gift" classification. The progressive diminu-
tion in the number of occupations which can be exercised without a license of
some sort seriously impairs the force of the view taken in a number of decisions
that the granting or refusal of a license is a purely discretionary matter requiring
no hearing. 3 This is recognized in another group of decisions requiring a hear-
ing before the refusal of a license. Licenses to practice as a physician,6" to
prosecute claims before an official board,57 and to deal in alcohol 6 have been held
to require a hearing. Revocation or refusal to renew a license requires notice
and hearing even where refusal to grant the license does not,6 9 the courts consid-
ering that a business or clientele built up in reliance upon the license is a vested
right of property which cannot be destroyed until proceedings at least quasi-
judicial have been had.
7 0
Summarizing, there seems to be a tendency to adopt, even in cases where no
constitutional right is involved, the principle broadly laid down by justice Holmes
in Miller v. Horton 71 that no matter where the legislature "draws the line the
owner has a right to a hearing on the question whether his property falls within
it, and this right is not destroyed by the fact that the line might have been drawn
so differently as unquestionably to include that property." Considered as a prin-
ciple of administrative law and of statutory construction, the majority of the
decided cases are in accord with this statement.
H. I. S.
' Dickinson, op. cit. supra note 2, at 286.
Hitchcock v. Smith, 34 App. D. C. 521 (191o).
'In re Schonmaker, i_ Misc. 648, 38 N. Y. Supp. 167 (1895).
a Gage v. Censors of New Hampshire Eclectic Medical Society, 63 N. H. 92 (1884).
' Goldsmith v. United States Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U. S. 117, 46 Sup. Ct. 215
(1926).
' Smith v. Foster, 15 F. (2d) IiS (S. D. N. Y. 1926). In this and the two preceding
cases the applicant had satisfied all technical or professional requisites for a license and was
rejected solely because not "worthy of public confidence".
' Garfield v. United States ex rel. Spalding, 32 App. D. C. 153 (19o8) ; Phillips v. Bal-
linger, 37 App. D. C. 46 (1911) ; Courier-Journal Co. v. Federal Radio Comm., 46 F. (2d)
614 (Ct. of App. D. C. 1931) (refusal to renew broadcasting license on former terms) ;
Blunt v. Shepardson, supra note 6; Lillienfeld v. Commonwealth, 92 Va: 818, 23 S. E. 882
(1896).
"Whether the right to practice medicine or law is property, in the technical sense, it
is a valuable franchise, and one of which a person ought not to be deprived, without being
offered an opportunity, by timely notice, to defend it." People for use of State Board of
Health v. McCoy, supra note 16, at 297, 17 N. E. at 788.
In New York a building permit cannot arbitrarily be revoked after construction has
been started, City of Buffalo v. Chadeayne, 134 N. Y. 163, 31 N. E. 443 (1892), but a license
to sell milk may be revoked without notice and hearing on the ground that there is no vested
right to continue in the milk business, even though a valuable good will is involved, People
ex rel. Lodes v. Dept. of Health of City of New York, supra note 18. In the latter case,
however, the court said that the licensee might have a remedy by mandamus if the revoca-
tion was "arbitrary, tyrannical, and unreasonable", or "based upon false information", thus
apparently applying the doctrine of collateral attack.
71Supra note 45, at 546. In Londoner v. Denver, supra note 30, it is said that although
a legislature miy fix a tax without notice and hearing, yet if it commits to some subordinate
body the duty of apportioning it, "due process" requiies a notice and hearing.
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AGGREGATION OF PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS TO MEET THE JURISDICTIONAL MINI-
mUm AMOUNT REQUIREMENT OF THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS-In every case
where the jurisdiction of a federal court is sought by two or more plaintiffs whose
claims are separately less than the requisite amount,' it becomes necessary to
decide whether or not they may be aggregated. Naturally the question has been
presented many times and only too frequently has it been answered affirmatively
in one case and negatively in another although the facts of the two cases have been
indistinguishable. Yet, in the opinions, there is a repeated reiteration of a single
fundamental rule and one looks in vain for dissenting opinions and directly
overruled prior decisions. 2  A question of so necessarily frequent presentation
demands what is tantamount to a rule-of-thumb as a guide to the answer, a rule
that is quickly and easily applied and is productive of consistent decisions. To
determine whether the rule that has been used meets this standard and to explain
why its application has brought about inconsistent decisions is the purpose of this
note.
The question was presented for the first time in an admiralty case, Olivier v.
Alexander,8 decided by the United States Supreme Court I nearly a century ago.
An appeal had been taken by the defendant from several decrees in favor of the
plaintiffs, seamen who were suing for wages. The decrees for less than the
jurisdictional amount were dismissed; since the claims were separate and based
on individual contracts they could not be aggregated. A joint suit was permitted,
the Court explained, merely for the sake of convenience. That parties may not
tack their separate claims merely because they are permitted, by statute or other-
wise, to sue together has been asserted clearly and unequivocally many times
since.5 It is significant that the Court seemed to think a joint suit 6 necessary if
the plaintiffs were to be permitted to aggregate the amounts of their claims:
"If the law were otherwise, it would operate in a most unjust and
oppressive manner; for then the seamen would be compellable to file a joint
libel; and if any controversy existed as to the claim of a single seaman, all
the others would be compellable to be dragged before the appellate tribunals
and incur enormous expenses, even when their own rights and claims were
beyond all controversy, and in truth, were not controverted." 7
'The United States District Courts have jurisdiction "when the matter in controversy
exceeds, exclusive of interest and costs, the sum or value (italics the writers) of $3,oo0 and
(a) arises under the constitution or laws of the United States, or (b) is between citizens of
different States, or (c) is between citizens of a State and foreign States, citizens, or sub-
jects", Judicial Code § 24, par. I (28 U. S. C. A. § 41, par. I). It has jurisdiction regardless
of the amount in controversy in the situations set out in the first part of the sentence of
paragraph one, ibid., i. e.. "all suits of a civil nature, at common law or in equity, brought by
the United States or an officer thereof authorized to sue; or between citizens of the same
State claiming under grants of different States." Paragraphs 4-25 of § 24 (28 U. S. C. A.,
pars. 4-25) enumerate exceptional instances of cases arising under the federal laws in which
no jurisdictional amount is necessary.
'The writer recalls no single dissenting opinion from his search through the reporters
o,f the last hundred years. Nor was any case discovered that expressly overruled a prior
inconsistent one.
'6 Pet. 143 (U. S. 1832).
' In determining whether claims may be aggregated the same general rule is applicable to
the original jurisdiction of the District Courts and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court, Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., 147 U. S. 370, 13 Sup. Ct. 348 (1892) ; Putney v.
Whitmire, 66 Fed. 385 (C. C. S. C. 1895). The amount is different ($5,ooo) as is the yard-
stick by which it is precisely measured, DoBmE, FEDERAL PROCEDURE (1928) §§ 56, 207.
r Clay v. Field. 138 U. S. 464, II Sup. Ct. 419 (189o) ; Fishback v. Western Union Tele-
graph Co., i61. U. S. 96, I6 Sup. Ct. 5o6 (895) ; Wheless v. St. Louis, 18o U. S. 379, 21
Sup. Ct. 402 (19oo) ; Troy Bank v. Whitehead, 222 U. S. 39, 32 Sup. Ct. 9 (I911).
' See for statements of this nature, Greene County v. Thomas, 211 U. S. 58, 29 Sup. Ct.
168 (I908) ; HUGHES, FEDERAL PROcEDURE (2d ed. 1913) 233.
" Per Justice Story, Olivier v. Alexander, 6 Pet. 143, 147 (U. S. 1832).
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Shields v. Thoims s distinguished the Olivier case and several other admiralty
cases following it ' and enunciated a differentiating criterion that is the essence of
the present rule. The distributees of intestate's personal property brought a bill
in equity against the husband of the administrator alleging that he had converted
part of the estate. The language of Chief Justice Taney has become classic. 10
"The matter in controversy . . . was the sum due to the representa-
tives of the deceased collectively; and not the particular sum to which each
was entitled, when the amount due was* distributed among them, according
to the laws of the state. They all claimed under one and the same title.
They had a common and undivided interest in the claim; and it was perfectly
immaterial to the appellant how it was to be shared among them. He had no
controversy with either of them on that point; and if there was any difficulty
as to the proportions in which they were to take, the dispute was among
themselves and not with him." 
11
It is evident that the test used in this case was not the jointness or severalness of
the suit.' 2  A joint interest, in its technical sense, was not necessary, for the
distributees held title as tenants-in-common.'3 The dictum of the Olivier case
was disregarded. But, as against the defendant, there was a single issue, the
right to the property, which was common to the plaintiffs by virtue of their con-
nection with one and the same title, that is, the intestate's. There was, as has
been aptly termed, an "integrated right" '" against the defendant.
Brief mention of another phase of the law of jurisdictional amount will be
helpful in the analysis of the rule as to aggregation. In injunction suits, brought
by a single complainant, two tests are commonly enumerated by writers;"r one,
the amount or value claimed by the complainant, the other the amount or value
which the respondent will lose if the complainant succeeds. The second was
enunciated in Mississippi & Mo. R. Co. v. Ward.0  Sharp criticism has been
levelled at this test on the ground that it brings confusion and uncertainty into
a 17 How. 3 (U. S. 1854).
'Stratton v. Jarvis, 8 Pet. 4 (U. S. 1834) ; Spear v. Place, ii How. 522 (U. S. 185o);
Rich v. Lambert, 12 How. 347 (U. S. 1851).
"Several other phrasings of this principle have also gained prominence: "The joinder
in one suit of several plaintiffs . . . who .night have siued . . . in separate actions
(italics the writers) does not enlarge the appellate jurisdiction; . . . when property or
money is claimed by several persons suing together, the test is whether they claim it under
one common right, the adverse party having no interest in its apportionment or distribution
among them, or claim it under separate and distinct rights, each of which is contested by the
adverse party", Gibson v. Shufeldt, 122 U. S. 27, 30, 7 Sup. Ct. io66, 1067 (1886) ; "If sev-
eral persons be joined in a suit, . . . and have a common and undivided interest, though
separable as between themselves, the amount of their joint (italics the writer's) claim or
liability will be the test of jurisdiction; but where their interests) are distinct, and they are
joined for the sake of convenience only and because they form a class of parties whose rights
or liabilities arose out of the same transaction, or have a relation to a common fund or mass
of property sought to be administered, such distinct demands or liabilities cannot be aggre-
gated . . .", Clay v. Field, supra note 5 at 479, I1 Sup. Ct. at 425 (189o) ; see similar state-
ments in Troy Bank v. Whitehead, suPra note 5 at 40, 32 Sup. Ct. 249 (1911) ; Pinel v. Pinel,
240 U. S. 594, 596, 36 Sup. Ct. 416, 417 (191o).
"* Shields v. Thomas, supra note 8, at 5.
"See the language used in Gibson v. Shufeldt, supra note IO.
"See quotation from Clay v. Field, supra note IO
,DoBm supra note 4, § 58, at 158.
"Hughes, siupra note 7, § 98; 1 Foster, Federal Practice (6th ed. 1920) § 13; Ros%, FED-
ERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE (4th ed. 1931) § 218; and see DoBm, smpra note 4, at 134,
22 Black 485 (U. S. 1862).
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what ought to be clear-cut and definite. 17 Recent decisions 1s indicate a tendency
to abandon the second test, the "defendant-viewpoint" as it has been called, but
the Ward case and those following it have never been expressly overruled,19 and
their force is still effective in some of the lower federal courts.2
Is not the test of the Shields case based primarily on the "defendant-
viewpoint"? Since a joint interest in the plaintiffs is not required is it not the
defendant's threatened loss rather than the plaintiff's interest, which is in fact
disinct from that of his co-plaintiff, that determines the amount in controversy?
His interest in the whole of the matter in dispute is solely for the purpose of
obtaining his particular portion. Were the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule strictly
applied to this situation aggregation would be denied. Technically, joint suits
would not be an exception, for in them the interest of each is for the whole
amount and therefore the problem of aggregation would never occur. In view
of the overcrowded federal dockets, particularly in non-federal matters, such a
rule as this might be employed with desirable results.
It is significant that the Shields and the Ward Cases were decided within
eight years of each other by substantially the same bench. However, the rule of
the former from continual reiteration has become so firmly entrenched that it is
not likely ever to be disturbed judicially; its soundness has never been questioned,
but it has brought about no few inconsistent decisions. It is based on a distinc-
tion between a principle common to all and a right or title common to all (an
"integrated" right). In the language of a lower federal court judge,
"The 'matter in dispute', within the meaning of the statute, is not the
principle or rule of decision which is involved in the controversy, and which
may be common to the interests of all the parties to the litigation, but it is
the money value which is at stake; and the claims of the several parties can-
not be added together to form the matter in dispute, unless each party has
an undivided interest in a claim to the property that is the subject of the
litigation." 21
As the logic of this distinction is not self-evident, very naturally in applying the
rule the dividing line is bent and stretched and cases properly belonging on the
one side are inadvertently placed on the other with results as already set forth.
The rule has been called "technical" ;22 it is clearly that. But a logical rule is
less necessary than one applied logically. Since it is firmly rooted in our law
some good may be done by showing wherein the courts have become confused in
its application.
'7 Dobie, Jurisdictional Amount in the United States District Courts (1926) 38 HARv. L.
REv. 733; (1926) I VA. L. REV. 513, contained in part, also, in Dobie, supra note 4, § 56.
This writer urges forcefully what he terms the "plaintiff-viewpoint" rule as a means of
reaching consistent results. See comment as to this in RosE, supra note 15.
'a Hunt v. New York Cotton Exchange, 2o5 U. S. 322, 27 Sup. Ct. 52gr (19o6) ; Bitter-
man v. L. & N. R. Co., 207 U. S. 205, 28 Sup. Ct. 91 (igo8) ; Glenwood Light & Water Co.
v. Mutual Light, Heat & Power Co., 239 U. S. 121, 36 Sup. Ct. 30 (915) ; Western & At-
lantic R. Co. v. Railroad Commission of Georgia, 261 U. S. 264, 43 Sup. Ct. 252 (1922) ;
Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S. 140, 44 Sup. Ct. 257 (923). The last mentioned case is some-
what confusing. It approves both the Ward and Hunt Cases, yet the Hunt case (ibid., at
336, 27 Sup. Ct. at 533) apparently disapproves the test of the Ward case. See also the
very recent case, Adam v. New York Trust Co., 37 Fed. (2d) 826, 827 (C. C. A. 5th, 193o)
in which all but the first and last of the above cases are cited with approval; Cf. Elliott v.
Empire Nat. Gas Co., 4 Fed. (2d) 493, 497 (C. C. A. 8th, 1925).
1 Ibid.
20 Johnson v. Pittsburgh, io6 Fed. 753 (C. C. Pa. i9oi) ; Northern Pac. R. Co. v. Pacific
Coast Lumber Mf'rs' Ass'n, 165 Fed. i (C. C. A. 9th, I905) ; Roland v. Jumper Creek
Drainage Dist., 4 Fed. (2d) 719 (D. C. Fla. 1925).
' Sioux Falls Nat. Bank v. Swenson, 48 Fed. 621, 625 (C. C. S. D. 1892).
' DoBiE, supra note 4, at 158.
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The cases fall into a few definite groups.23  The first, taxpayer's suits, have
caused little difficulty. 4 Here the distinction between a principle common to all
and a right common to all has been recognized. The citizen's constitutional
guaranty is, in these cases, a principle common to all. But the rights against the
person or persons violating this guaranty derive in no way from a common source.
They are inherently distinct to the individual.
A class of cases apparently rife with confusion both in the Supreme Court
and in the lower federal courts, is that embracing what are termed "creditors
bills". In these cases suit is brought by one or more in behalf of others similarly
situated either to obtain property that a debtor has disposed of or threatens to
dispose of by fraudulent preference; 20 or to have a receiver appointed for an
insolvent corporation;2 or to compel shareholders to pay into court as a "trust
fund" what is owing to the insolvent corporation on unpaid subscriptions ;27 or
to enforce shareholder's stgtutory liability2 s In all of these cases there is an
existing fund or one sought to be created, out of which the creditors are entitled
to satisfy their claims. The principle of the Shields case is invariably invoked
and urged upon the courts. In the earlier cases this was done unsuccessfully.20
The claims of the creditors were recognized as being separate, both against the
defendant or defendants and among themselves. There was no common title
giving rise to a single common right; after the principle common to all, the right
to reach particular property, was determined there still remained to be determined
the validity of the separate claim of each creditor.
However, the combined force of repeated efforts finally came to fruition.
The facts of Handley v. Stutz 80 were most conducive to a misstep. A bill was
brought by three creditors, two of whom had claims separately satisfying the
jurisdictional requirement. The remaining one, and the many others later join-
' Overby v. Gordon, 177 U. S. 214, 26 Sup. Ct. 603 (1899) (validity of exclusion of next
of kin from will); Morgan v. Adams, 211 U. S. 627, 29 Sup. Ct. 313 (193o) (legacies con-
tested for undue influence) ; New Orleans Pacific R. Co. v. Parker, 143 U. S. 42, 12 Sup. Ct.
485 (1891) (bondholder's suit to foreclose mortgage) ; cf. Bruce v. Manchester & Keene R.
Co., 117 U. S. 54, 6 Sup. Ct. 849 (188.5) (foreclosure of mortgage incidental to recovery
on separate bonds) ; Henderson v. Wadsworth, 115 U. S. 264, 6 Sup. Ct. 40 (1885) (suit
against heirs on testator's note) ; Pinel v. Pinel, 24o U. S. 594, 36 Sup. Ct. 416 (95)
(statutory intestacy on ground of mistake).
' Walter v. Northeastern R. Co., stepra note 4 (against the sheriffs of different coun-
ties); Wheless v. St. Louis R. Co. (assessment for improvements attacked), Fishback v.
Western Union Telegraph Co. (against sheriffs of different counties), both supra note 5.
Contra: Brown v. Trousdale, 138 U. S. 389, II Sup. Ct. 3o (i8go) (suit to have bondst de-
clared invalid); City of Ottumwa v. City Water Supply Co., 11g Fed. 315 (C. C. A. 8th,
19o2) (adopting "defendant-viewpoint" rule) ; Johnson v. Pittsburgh, supra note 2o. Com-
pare Hawley v. Fairbanks, 1o8 U. S, 543, 2 Sup. Ct. 846 (1882) with Davis v. Corbin, H12
U. S. 36, 5 Sup. Ct. 4 (1884) (mandamus by judgment creditors of city to compel collection
of tax bond for their benefit).
-1 Seaver v. Bigelows, 5 Wall. 2o8 (U. S. 1866) (refused fund as determinant) ; Fourth
Nat. Bank v. Stout, 113 U. S. 684, 5 Sup. Ct. 695 (1884) (same) ; Stewart v. Dunham, 115
U. S. 61, 5 Sup. Ct. 1163 (1885) (one claim satisfied the amount requirement) ; Gibson v.
Shufeldt, suPra note 1O; Stanwood v. Wishard, 134 Fed. 959 (C. C. Iowa 1905) (several
claims satisfied the amount requirement) ; cf. Estes v. Gunter, 121 U. S. 183, 7 Sup. Ct. 854
(1887) (bill by preferred creditor to have assignment declared valid).
-"Jones v. Mutual Fidelity Co., 123 Fed. 5o6 (C. C. D. Del. 1903) ("defendant-view-
point" rule); McAtamney v. Comm. Hotel Construction Corp., 296 Fed. soo (D. C. N. Y.
1924).
^'Hatch v. Dana, ioi U. S, 205 (1879) ; Patterson v. Lynde, xo6 U. S. 519, I Sup. Ct.
432 (1882) ; Handley v. Stutz, 137 U. S. 366, 1I Sup. Ct: 117 (189o) ; Reagan v. Midland
Packing Co., 298 Fed. 500 (D. C. Iowa 1924).
' Handley v. Stutz, supra note 27; Conway v. Owensboro Savings B. & T. Co., 165
Fed. 822 (C. C. D. Ky. I98), aff'd 185 Fed. 950 (C. C. D. Ky. 1911).
2' See particularly Clay v. Fields, supra note IO, Seaver v. Bigelows, Gibson v. Shufeldt,
both supra note 26. In the last mentioned case there is an excellent compilation and discus-
sion of all of the cases preceding it.
ISupra note 27.
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ing, all claimed less. It was then well established that if one creditor's claim
satisfied the requirement jurisdiction would be retained to give relief to the others
similarly situated.31 In fact, the Court was bound by a prior decision to do so3'
The misstep was made in the dictum of justice Gray, who four years before had
made an exhaustive survey of the previous cases.
"Such a bill as this could not have been filed in his (the creditor's) own
behalf only, and the case does not fall under that class in which creditors,
who might have sued severally, join in one bill for convenience and to save
expense." 83
justice Gray was apparently led astray by the fact that such a suit must
necessarily enure to the benefit of all of the creditors. But that fact has no
pertinence in the application of the rule concerning aggregation. It abandons
the test, the "oneness" of the plaintiffs' rights. This idea combined with a
"defendant-viewpoint" attitude on the part of some lower federal courts and
developed a theory that the amount of the "trust fund" should be taken as the
matter in controversy. Consequently these decisions are inconsistent with those
in which the rule of the Shields case is correctly applied. They are confusing
because often "lip-service" is paid to the rule. The latest expression of the
Supreme Court reasserts the test of the Shields case and confines Handley v.
Stutz to its decision. In Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v. Karatz,4 Justice Brandeis,
speaking for the Court, says briefly:-"
"Where a creditor's bill has been entertained by this court, the amount
- of a single plaintiff's claim has been enough to satisfy the jurisdictional
requirement." 36
At the present time only a few cases have decided the question of aggregation
where shareholders of a corporation have been the plaintiffs. These, so far as
the writer could find, are from the lower federal courts. They fall generally into
two classes: (a) the "representative suit" 37 or "stockholders bill" " as it is
variously called; (b) suits in equity to have a receiver appointed and the corpora-
tion's assets liquidated for the benefit of the shareholders.39 The first is technical
in its nature. It is brought to enforce a corporate right that the managers refuse
to prosecute or in the breach of which they are themselves engaged. Either of
these situations must be shown before the shareholders are entitled to bring suit.
4 0
'Johnson v. Waters, iii U. S. 640, 4 Sup. Ct. 61g (1883) ; Stanwood v. Wishard, Stew-
art v. Dunham, both supra note 25; Hatch v. Dana, Reagan v. Midland Packing Co., both
supra note 27.
'Johnson v. Waters, supra note 31.
"Handley v. Stutz, supra note 27, at 369.
"262 U. S. 77,43 SUp. Ct. 480 (1922).
The Court affirmed Troy Bank v. Whitehead & Co., supra note 5, in which the prin-
ciple of the Shields case was correctly applied and which reversed the lower court's decision
in 184 Fed. 932 (C. C. Ky. 191o) (Bill by transferees of two notes, secured by a single lien,
to enforce the lien) ; cf. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. v. Waterman, io6 U. S. 265 (1882)
(the liens here were separate).
Supra note 34, at 86n, 43 Sup. Ct. 483n.
Note (1931) 15 MINx. L. REv. 453.
I FosTER, FEDmA PRACTICE (6th ed. i920) 145.
'Towle v. American B., L. & Inv. Soc., 6o Fed. i3i (C. C. Ill. 1894) (receiver);
Robinson v. West Virginia Loan, 9o Fed. 770 (C. C. W. Va. 1898) ; Taylor v. Decatur Min-
ing & Land Co., 112 Fed. 449 (C. C. Ala. igoi) ; Jacobs v. Mexican Sugar Co., 13o Fed. 589
(C. C. N. J. 19o4); Kent v. Honsinger, 167 Fed. 619 (C. C. N. Y. i9o9).
I Note (ig3i) I5 MINN. L. Rav. 453 at 456n.
NOTES
Since the right involved is a single one, belonging to a single legal person, the
corporation, the fact that under exceptional circumstances it may be protected by
many should not alter its 'primary character. The interest of the shareholders,
although manifestly several, is secondary. 4  The cases uniformly so hold.
42
Either because of a failure to distinguish the essential difference between
these two classes, or else because of the continuing influence of the Ward and
Handley cases the majority of lower federal courts have held the "matter in con-
troversy" in the second class of cases to be the amount of the "trust fund".4 3
This is plainly incorrect, for the shareholder's interest here is no different from
the creditor's under like circumstances, and in the latter it has been pointed out
the law is now definitely settled; the separate claim must exceed the requisite
amount. It makes no difference that the suit is that of a class, in which all are
mutually interested, for:
" . . . that it may be properly a class action does not affect the rule against
aggregation, because the rule is necessarily only applicable to those class
actions in which several claimants to a fund are joined as plaintiffs asserting
common and undivided rights therein." 44
It is well to note in conclusion that the bulk of cases pertaining to the amount
requirement arise in diversity of citizenship controversies, a field of concurrent
jurisdiction with state courts. This portion of federal jurisdiction has suffered
serious attacks 45 and has had its very existence threatened to extinction by pro-
jected legislation.46  The rule governing aggregation has been carelessly applied
in the past partly because some courts have not been reluctant to accept jurisdic-
tion of the disputes. This seems to be changing with the increasing amount of
business brought before the federal courts.47 Lion Bonding & Surety Co. v.
"BALLANTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS (1927) § 185; CLARK, CORPORATIONS (3d ed.
1916) 484; Note (ig3i) I 5MINN. L. Rzv. 453.
'Hill v. Glasgow, 41 Fed. 6Io (C. C. Ky. 1888) (to restrain director's alleged illegal
use of corporate funds) ; McKee v. Chautauqua Assembly, 124 Fed. 8o8 (C. C. N. Y. 1903) ;
Larabee v. Dolley, 175 Fed. 365 (C. C. Kan. i9o9), reversed on other grounds, sub nomne
Dolley v. Abilene Nat. Bank, 179 Fed. 461 (C. C. A. 8th, igxo) ; Hutchinson Box Board &
Paper Co. v. Van Horn, 299 Fed. 424 (C. C. A. 8th, 1924); Haynes v. Fraternal Aid Union,
34 Fed. (2d) 3o.5, 3o8 (D. C. Kan. 1929), "Those were cases; where each plaintiff claimed
that somebody owed him something, and are not in point here. The plaintiffs claim that the
defendants owe the society money in excess of $3,ooo"; I Fosm, supra note 38; cf. Harvey
v. Raleigh & G. R. Co., 89 Fed. I15 (C. C. N. C. 1898); Carpenter v. Knolwood Cemetery,
198 Fed. 297 (D. C. Mass. 19m).
"Kent v. Honsinger, Taylor v. Decatur Mining & Land Co., Towle v. American B., L.
& Inv. Co., all supra note 39. A contrary and, it is submitted, a more correct view was taken
in Jacobs v. Mexican Sugar Co., 130 Fed. 589, 59, (C. C. N. J. 19o4) in which it was said,
"He (shareholder or creditor) seeks the intervention of the court in its (the corporation's)
affairs, in the manner provided by statute, to save himself as far as possible from financial
loss. . . . If successful there will, in the final outcome, when the corporation's affairs are
wound up, be a money decree establishing his right to share in what is realized if the assets
go far enough, or in favor of others who are necessarily brought into court by the proceeding
if they do not."
"Eberhard v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 241 Fed. 353, 356 (C. C. A. 6th, x917).
"For a thorough discussion of the many aspects of this particular problem see, Frank-
furter, Distribution of Judicial Power Between United States, and State Courts (1928) 13
CORN. L. Q. 499; Brown, The Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts Based on Diversity of Citi-
zenship (1929) 78 U. OF PA. L. REv. 179.
"8 Norris Bill, S. 3151, 70th Congress.
'T See, for example, peremptory refusal to aggregate in class suits in recent cases, Woods
v. Thompson, 14 Fed. (2d) 95I (C. C. A. 7th, 1926) ; Cohn v. Cities Service Co., 45 Fed.
(2d) 687 (C. C. A. 2d, i93o) (Stockholder's suit to prevent alleged unlawful withdrawal of
offer of right to subscribe for shares).
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Karatz is a landmark in a field outstanding for a generous acceptance of jurisdic-
tion. It should be followed in other classes of cases. The minimum amount is
recognizedly too low. But to increase it would be unavailing were aggregation
of claims freely permitted to accompany the increase. By scrutinizing carefully
the nature of the issue and permitting aggregation only where the interests of
several plaintiffs are common to a single title or right, the essence of the rule as it
has been frequently stated, much of the abuse on federal jurisdiction in non-
federal matters can be eliminated. Further, consistent decisions will thereby be
forthcoming, a factor of no trifling importance.
D. J. S.
